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China is expected to experience a rapid ageing process because of its low fertility rate, 
the ageing of the large baby boom generation and the improvement of mortality rates. 
Fertility and mortality rates are smaller for the urban than for the rural population, as a 
consequence of which the rapid urbanization will play an important role in changes in 
the age structure of the Chinese population. This paper estimates China’s future 
population and labor force by developing a novel population forecast model that 
combines information about age-specific parameters on fertility and mortality for both 
rural and urban areas with information about rural-urban migration and transformation 
of rural areas into urban areas. We find that (i) the share of people aged 65+ in China’s 
total population will double between 2010 and 2030, and the ageing problem in rural 
areas will be more serious than in urban areas; (ii) China’s total labor force will 
decrease by 6% between 2010 and 2030, irrespective of potential relaxation of birth 
control policies; and (iii) China’s urbanization rate will increase from 50% in 2010 to 
71% in 2030. These projections deviate considerably from projections by the United 
Nations (2013). 
 







Ageing of the population will be an important concern for China in the upcoming 
decades. Basically, three causes can be distinguished. First, the fertility rate is low. 
After the one-child policy was launched in the 1980s, China’s fertility rate declined 
substantially (Poston and Gu, 1987). According to the latest national population 
census data (NBS, 2012), China’s fertility rate was 1.18 in 2010, which is clearly 
much lower than the replacement level of 2.10. If the current child control policy is 
not loosened, China’s fertility rate is expected to remain at this low level. Second, 
China’s large baby boom generation, which was born in the 1960s, will gradually 
retire in the following two decades, which will cause a substantial reduction in the 
share of the labor force in the total population. Third, the improvement of health care 
in China has led to an increased life expectancy, which contributes to the increase in 
the population share of the elderly. These three factors (i.e. the low level fertility rate, 
the ageing of the large baby boom generation, and the improvement of the mortality 
rates) will boost the ageing process of China in the following decades. 
Another aspect is that ageing will affect rural areas different than urban areas. 
On the one hand, the fertility rate and the mortality rate are both significantly lower 
for the urban than for the rural population. This will increase ageing more in urban 
than in rural areas. On the other hand, ongoing urbanization should be taken into 
account. In the past two decades, many people migrated from rural to urban areas and 
the urban areas expanded. The urbanization rate (i.e., the share of the population 
living in urban areas) increased from 26.4% in 1990 to 50.0% in 2010, which is an 
annual increase of 1.2 %-point on average. This rapid urbanization trend is expected 
to continue in the future, given China’s industrialization process (United Nations, 
2012; Zheng, 2011). Characteristic for the urbanization process is that, in particular, 
young people migrate from rural to urban areas. This is likely to cause the ageing 
problem to be more serious in rural areas than in urban areas. The question is which 
of the two forces is stronger? 
3 
 
This paper projects the development of the age structure of the Chinese 
population until 2030, distinguishing between rural and urban areas and taking 
urbanization into full account. Such projections are relevant because many 
socio-economic issues arise with demographic changes. For instance, due to the 
retirement of the baby boom generation, the size of the labor force will decrease. This 
may have adverse effects on the long-run economic growth of China, which is highly 
dependent on the input of labor. It is thus important to know the future size of the 
labor force (i.e. the people in the age group 15-64). The reason for choosing 2030 as 
the projection year is that the effect of the retirement of the baby boomers will emerge 
around 2030. If the projection interval is shorter than 2010-2030, this effect would be 
neglected. A longer projection interval increases the uncertainty of the projection 
because assumptions for the long-term changes in China’s fertility and mortality rates 
are required. 
We develop a rural-urban population model that has the following 
characteristics. It is an age-sex specific model with a module for the rural population 
and a module for the urban population. This distinction allows for demographic 
heterogeneities between rural and urban areas, and for modeling the urbanization 
process by means of the rural-urban transition. We calibrate the model using data 
from the 2010 population census (NBS, 2012).  
Recent projections for China’s future population are United Nations (2013) and 
Mai et al. (2013). The projections by the United Nations (2013) are also based on the 
2010 census data, whereas Mai et al. (2013) project China’s population in 2050 based 
on China’s 2000 population census data. Neither model distinguishes between rural 
and urban population. These projections thus cannot capture the unequal effects of 
ageing for the rural and urban populations, and cannot incorporate the effects of  
urbanization on countrywide ageing, as done in this study. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
China’s current population profile and the rural-urban demographic heterogeneity. 
The rural-urban population model is presented in Section 3 and Section 4 deals with 
the quantification of parameters through assumptions or estimates. Section 5 projects 
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China’s population to 2030 under several fertility scenarios, Section 6 compares our 
findings with the other projections in the literature, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. A sketch of China’s population profile and the rural-urban demographic 
heterogeneity 
 
According to the 2010 population census data (NBS, 2012), China’s total population 
was around 1,340 million in 2010. The share of the population that was 65 years or 
older (age group 65+) was 8.9%, which was low when compared to developed 
countries. For example, the share of people aged 65+ was 13.1% in the US, 22.7% in 
Japan, and 20.4 % in Germany. However, when evaluated against the standard ageing 
line of 7% as set by the United Nations (United Nations, 1956), China actually had 
already become an ageing country.  
Figure 1 depicts the age structure of the rural and urban population in 2010. It 
shows that a relatively large share of China’s population was in the age group 35-49, 
both for the rural and the urban population. This age group consists of the baby boom 
generation born in the 1960s, when China just pulled out of the great famine. The 
age-group 20-24 covers a major part of the offspring of the baby boom generation and 
was also relatively large. A substantial proportion of the baby boom generation will 
survive the following two decades and contribute to China’s ageing problem towards 
the end of this period. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
The age structures of the rural and urban population were quite different in 2010. 
The share of young people (i.e. aged 0-14) was clearly larger for the rural than for the 
urban population and the same was true (although to a lesser extent) for the share of 
old people (i.e. aged 65+). The opposite held for the share of the young labor force 
(i.e. aged 15-34), which was smaller for the rural than for the urban population. These 
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different age structures are in line with the differences in fertility rates and the 
rural-urban migration, whereas different mortality rates seem to have dampened the 
disparities somewhat. 
What factors underlie these differences? First, rural and urban areas faced 
different policies for child control, which led to different fertility rates. In the rural 
areas, the “one and a half” children policy was followed, which meant that rural 
couples were allowed to have a second child if their first child was female. In the 
urban areas, however, the “only one child” policy was executed, which allowed urban 
couples to have only one child. Figure 2 gives the age specific fertility rates for 2000 
and 2010, for the rural and the urban population. It shows that the rural fertility rate 
was higher than the urban fertility rate for any age. This partly explains why the share 
of young people in the rural population was larger than in the urban population.  
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
Second, many young rural workers migrated to work in urban areas during 
China’s industrialization process. Although the urban fertility rate was lower than the 
rural fertility rate, the urban population gained additional young workers via the 
immigration of rural people. This migration pattern led to a relatively large share of 
the young people in the urban population.  
Besides fertility and migration, the rural and urban populations also had a large 
demographic disparity in their mortality rates. Figure 3 shows that the mortality rate 
of the rural population was larger than that of the urban population, in particular for 
newborn children (age 0) and for the population aged 65+. This has dampened the 
disparities. That is, if the rural and urban population would have had the same 
mortality rates, the difference between the rural and the urban population share for the 
young people (0-14) would have been larger than it actually was in 2010. The same 
holds for the age group 65+. 
 





3. The rural-urban population model  
 
China’s rural and urban population behave quite differently in many demographic 
aspects, such as fertility, mortality and migration. These demographic heterogeneities 
have caused different age structures and will play an important role in China’s future 
population growth. In order to adequately project the dynamics of China’s population, 
it is necessary to include these demographic heterogeneities in a rural-urban 
population model. The structure of our rural-urban population model is similar to the 
multiregional type of population projection model (Rogers, 1995; Wilson and Rees, 
2005). It generates separate future profiles of the rural and the urban population and, 
by incorporating migration into the model, provides forecasts of the urbanization 
process in China. 
The model is age-sex specific and includes two modules, a rural module and an 
urban module. Suppose the projection interval is one year and classify the rural and 
urban population in the following h+1 age groups. Age group 0 includes individuals 
who are aged 0 at the end of the year, age group 1 includes individuals aged 1 at the end 
of the year, …, age group h includes all individuals aged h or older. In what follows, we 
will use superscript r for rural and u for urban. Variables related to females will be 
indicated by italic letters (e.g. x), those for males will also include a tilde (e.g. ). 
 
Definitions 
, : the number of female and male individuals aged i at the end of year t. 
: the fertility rate of age group i in year t (assuming that birth takes place at the start of 
year t+1).1 
: the probability that a new birth in year t is female. 
, 	 : the mortality rate of female and male individuals in age group i in year t, i.e. 
                                                             
1
 Females from age 15 to age 49 are regarded to have reproduction ability. This means  = 0 for i = 
0, …, 14 and i > 49. 
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the probability that an individual aged i-1 at the end of year t-1, dies in year t. 
 gives the probability that a baby that is born at the start of year t dies before 
the end of the year. 
 = 1 −, ̃ = 1 −	 : the probability that a female and male individual of age 
group i survives in year t. 
, : the rural-urban population transition rate of female and male individuals of age 
group i in year t (which is assumed to take place at the start of the year). 
  
For each age-sex group, the rural-urban population transition rate equals the ratio of the 
net number of rural individuals who become urban individuals2 and the total number of 
rural individuals. This transition stems from two causes. First, by migration. Second, 
rural areas may become urban areas. A rural individual then becomes an urban 
individual without physically moving but through the expansion of the urban areas. 
With the economic development of China, more and more rural areas have 
administratively (and thus statistically) become urban areas. 
 
Rural females 
For the rural population, equations are required for age-specific females and males. The 
female rural babies (who have age 0 at the end of the year t+1) are born at the start of 
the year t+1. Some of them will become urban (e.g. due to migration) and of those that 



























it nf0  gives the rural babies born at the start of year t+1.  
The number of rural individuals of age group i (= 1, …, h-1) at time t+1 equals the 
                                                             
2
 For a specific age group, the number of rural individuals who transit to urban individuals minus the 
number of urban individuals who transit to rural individuals yields the net number of rural individuals 
who transit to urban individuals. 
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survivors of the rural part (i.e. those that have not become urban) of the rural 







ti nksn ,11,1,1, )1( −+++ −= , 1,,2,1 −= hi K  
 
The individuals of the last age group at the end of year t+1 are the survivors of those 
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Rural males 
The model for the male population is basically the same as for the female population, 




























ti nksn ,11,1,1, ~)
~1(~~
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Urban females 
The urban population model is basically the same as the rural population model. The 
difference is that part of the rural population becomes urban via the rural-urban 
population transition. The urban population receives these rural individuals at the start 
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4. Estimation of the parameters 
 
The rural-urban population model consists of variables (, ) and parameters (, 
, , ̃, , and ). The working of the model is fairly simple: given the values 
for the variables  and  in t = 2010 and given estimates for the parameters, the 
population in t = 2011 can be projected, and so forth. This section describes how the 
estimates have been obtained and what assumptions have been made. 
 
The probabilities that a new birth is female 
For the probability that a new birth is female, we use the proportion of females in the 
number of newborn babies. In 2010, this proportion was 45.6% for rural newborn 
babies and 46.3% for urban newborn babies. The proportions were almost the same in 
2000, namely 45.6% and 46.5%, respectively. Therefore, for our projections we assume 
that the probability that a new birth is female is fixed at the level of 2010.  
 




The fertility rates 
In 1980, the Chinese government launched the so-called one-child policy to control the 
rapid population expansion. After several adjustments, China’s child policy differs 
nowadays across regions (i.e. rural and urban areas) as well as across nationalities. 
Urban couples are allowed to have only one child, rural couples, however, are allowed 
to have a second child if the first child is a girl. Couples from certain minorities in the 
population (e.g. couples with an Uygur nationality in Xinjiang province) are allowed to 
have two or more children. An adjustment that was implemented in 2014 is that couples 
are allowed to have a second child if one (or both) of the parents is an only child. 
The strict policy of child control led to rather low and stable fertility rates for 
quite a long time. According to China’s population census data (NBS, 2002; NBS, 
2012), the total fertility rate (TFR)3 of the rural population was 1.43 in 2000 and 1.44 in 
2010, and the TFR of the urban population was 0.94 in 2000 and 0.98 in 2010. Both the 
rural and the urban TFR are significantly lower than the replacement rate of 2.10. 
Because the child control policy is much tighter for the urban population than for the 
rural population, the urban TFR obviously is lower than the rural TFR. From an 
age-specific fertility perspective, an obvious difference between 2000 and 2010 is that 
childbearing takes place at a later stage in life. Figure 2 shows that the hump in the 
graph shifted to the right (i.e. towards higher ages), which holds both for rural and for 
urban females. This means that the fertility rate of younger women is decreasing and 
that of older women increasing. More and more Chinese females plan to give birth at a 
later stage in their life. However, this shift in the timing of the childbearing has had very 
little effect on the TFR. The effect of the increased fertility rate of older women is 
canceled out by the effect of a decreased fertility rate of younger women. For our 
projections we make assumptions for the TFR. After the TFR for any year t has been set, 
the age specific fertility rates in t are obtained by proportionally adjusting the age 
specific fertility rates of 2010. In a sensitivity analysis we found that changes in the age 
                                                             
3
 The total fertility rate is the sum of the age specific fertility rates. It measures the average number of children a 
woman would bear if she survives through the reproductive age span and experiences at each age the age-specific 
fertility rate of that period. 
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specific fertility rates only had very minor effects as long as the TFR is the same.  
It should be pointed out that the fertility level has been one of the most 
controversial issues in studies on China’s population. Many researchers and also 
Chinese government officials believe that the TFRs derived from the census data are 
much lower than the true levels (see Zeng, 1996; Goodkind, 2004; Guo, 2004; Zhang 
and Zhao, 2006; Morgan et al., 2009; Cai, 2013). The underestimated fertility is mainly 
due to China’s strict child control policy. On the one hand, strictly implementing child 
control policy is an important task for local governments. On the other hand, families 
with unauthorized births will be punished. Therefore, both families and local 
governments have a strong incentive to hide unauthorized births which are thus 
systematically underreported in census data. Studies have found that a large number of 
new births and children are missing in the 1990 and 2000 censuses (Zhang and Cui, 
2002). Although some steps have been taken to address the underreporting problem in 
the 2010 census procedure, the TFR derived from the 2010 census data is still believed 
to be lower than the true level (Cai, 2013). The common opinion is that TFRs from the 
census data cannot be used directly and need to be adjusted. 
For our projections we use two fertility scenarios so as to take possible future 
adjustments of China’s child control policy into account. The baseline scenario 
assumes a constant fertility rate. We assume that China’s child control policy will not 
change during the projection period (i.e. 2011-2030). The TFRs for both the rural and 
the urban population are fixed at the levels of 2010, which have been adjusted because 
of underreporting. The rate of underreporting can be estimated by taking the number of 
new births from the 2000 population census data, calculate how many would have 
statistically survived the period 2000-20104, and compare that with the number of 10 
years old children in the 2010 population census data. We find that the number of 10 
years old children in the 2010 population census data is 1.08 times the survivors of the 
new births in 2000. Considering the possibility that also the number of 10 year old 
children is underreported in the 2010 population census data, the TFR from the 2000 
data seems to be underreported by at least 8%. We use this rate to adjust the TFR in 
                                                             
4
 The survivors during 2000-2010 of the new births in 2000 is calculated as , × , × …× ,. 
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2010 from 1.44 to 1.55 for the rural population and from 0.98 to 1.05 for the urban 
population.5 The age specific fertility rates are thus magnified by the same proportion. 
 
Assumption 2A.  = ..  	,  and  = .."# 	, , for t = 2011, …, 2030. 
 
The second scenario reflects the possibility that the Chinese government may 
adopt a relatively loose child control policy in the future. Many demographers believe 
that China’s child control policy should gradually be relaxed. An option that has 
received widespread attention is the so-called “two children with late childbearing 
soft-landing” proposal by Zeng (2006, 2007). It suggests a smooth transition period of 
about seven years, after which all couples in China are allowed to have a second child. 
Zeng (2006) estimates the rural TFR to be 2.27 and the urban TFR to be 1.80, after the 
transition has been finished. Note that this is in line with the most recent adjustment by 
the Chinese government of the child control policy. Starting in 2014, couples are 
allowed to have a second child if at least one of the parents is an “only child”. 
For our projections, we adopt Zeng’s proposal and assume for the years 
2011-2013 that the rural and urban TFRs are fixed at the adjusted level of 2010 (i.e. 
1.55 for the rural TFR and 1.05 for the urban TFR). The implementation of the two 
children policy starts in 2014 and the TFRs increase linearly in seven years to their 
2020 levels. These are 2.27 for the rural population and 1.80 for the urban population. 
For the distribution of the increases in TFR over the age-specific fertility rates, it should 
be noted that the increased fertility is only due to an increase in the number of second 
children. The implicit assumption here is that family planning and thus the first child 
fertility rate is not affected by the implementation of the two children policy. For the 
distribution we use proportions based on the age-specific second child fertility rate in 
2010.6 The proportion for age group i (denoted by $  for rural rates and $  for 
urban rates) is calculated by dividing the second child fertility rate of age group i by the 
                                                             
5
 According to Cai (2013), the estimate of China’s aggregate TFR in 2010 is around 1.5. 
6
 For a specific age group i, the second child fertility rate is defined as the ratio between the number of females in age 
group i that give birth to a second child and the total number of females in age group i. 
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sum of the second child fertility rates across all age groups. The information on 
age-specific second child fertility rates can be obtained from the population census data. 








.  , 																																																						) = 2011,… ,2013.
.  , + .,-., .) − 2013/$							) = 2011,… ,2013.







."#, 																																																						) = 2011, … ,2013.
."#, + .#-., .) − 2013/$							) = 2011,… ,2013.
."#, + .1.80 − 1.05/$																) = 2011,… ,2013
 
 
Note that TFR = ∑  = 2.27  for ) = 2020,… ,2030 , because ∑ , =
TFR = 1.44  and ∑ $ = 1 . In the same way, TFR = 1.80  for ) =
2020, … ,2030. 
 
The mortality rates 
Improvements in the living conditions and progress of medical technology have 
increased the life expectancy at birth of the Chinese population considerably, from 71.4 
years in 2000 to 74.8 in 2010. Figure 3 showed that the decreases in the mortality rates 
between 2000 and 2010 were significant, in particular for newborn children and for the 
elderly (i.e. 65+). For instance, the 2010 census data shows that the infant mortality 
rates are 4.7‰ for the rural population and 2.5‰ for the urban population.7 The 
substantial reduction of mortality rate suggested by the 2000 and 2010 census data 
confirms China’s continued improvement in health, which is not unexpected for a 
country with rapid and persistent economic growth. Given that the current life 
                                                             
7
 It should be pointed out that China’s mortality rates in the census data is also likely to be underestimated, especially 
for babies and young children (Cai, 2013). The reported infant mortality rates are very low. If the census data were 
accurate, China would be one of the countries with the lowest infant mortality rates in the world. Using these 
mortality rates for population projections implies that the survivals of babies and young children will—to some 
extent—be overestimated.  
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expectancy at birth in developed countries is around 80 years, China’s mortality rate is 
expected to continue to decrease in the following two decades. 
To forecast China’s future age-specific mortality rates we use the Lee-Carter 
model (Lee and Carter, 1992). It is a leading statistical model for mid-term (around 50 
years) forecasts of mortality rates and has been successfully applied to almost all 
countries that have reliable data and are in normal socioeconomic conditions (Booth, 
2006; Li et al., 2013). Its main underlying assumption is that the future annual rate of 
decline of the age-specific mortality rates equals the average rate of decline in a past 
period for which data are available. 
The Lee-Carter model has two characteristics that make it very appropriate for 
our case. First, only two years of historical data are sufficient to apply the model, which 
is attractive for countries with limited data availability, such as China. Second, the 
forecasts for age-specific mortality rates obtained from the Lee-Carter model always 
satisfy the desirable property that they are positive.   
However, the Lee-Carter model also suffers from some limitations. It assumes 
that the historical average rate of decline in the age-specific mortality rates will prolong 
to the future. As Girosi and King (2008) point out, it may be reasonable to assume that 
the historical pattern continues in the short run. Over a longer time period, however, the 
model forecasts may diverge from empirical patterns. For instance, when the forecast 
period is very long, reversions in the rank order of the age-specific mortality rates may 
occur when the Lee-Carter model is used.8 In this respect, Li et al. (2013) conclude that 
reversion of rank orders makes little or no difference for projections in most countries, 
except in countries with life expectancies above 80. As mentioned earlier in this section, 
the life expectancy in China is still far lower, so we believe it is plausible to assume that 
China’s historical pattern of changes in age-specific mortality rates during 2000-2010 
will continue also in the following two decades. In addition, the forecasts (which are 
shown later, in Figure 4) based on this assumption do not show serious problems in 
terms of reverted rank orders of the age-specific mortality rates. We therefore feel it is 
                                                             
8
 Reversion of the rank order means that the mortality rate of group i is larger than the mortality rate of 
age group j in time period t, whereas it is forecasted to be smaller in period k.  
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reasonable to forecast these mortality rates for China by using the Lee-Carter model. 
The model assumes an exponential change in the age-specific mortality rates, 
which is specified as 
 
ittiiit vm εβα ++=ln   (i = 0, 1, …, h; t = 1, 2, …, T)                    (1) 
 
iα , iβ  and tv  are parameters to be estimated and itε  are random disturbances with 
mean 0 and variance 2σ . tv  represents the combined effects of exogenous factors 
(such as medical technology and economic growth) that have a systematic impact on 
the mortality rates of all age groups. Although tv  has an impact on the mortality rates 
of all age groups, the magnitude of the impact varies across age groups. Some age 
groups benefit more than other age groups and this difference is captured by iβ , which 
represents the effect of tv  on age group i. Equation (1) is estimated by using the 
singular value decomposition (SVD) approach (see the Appendix). This yields 
67 = ln:;;;;;; = ∑ ln<= /?, the average of ln  over time, and estimates @A  (i = 
1, …, h) and B7 (t = 1, …, T).  
In the forecasting procedure, we want to calculate C ,<DE . As Equation (1) 
indicates, the forecast depends on (i) the estimated parameters 67  and @A , both of 
which are fixed over time, and (ii) the parameter B7<DE  that is time varying. The 
forecast yields lnC ,<DE = 67 + @AB7<DE . Because the parameters B7<DE  are time 
varying, they are obtained by specifying the following random walk with drift model. 
  
ttt vv µθ ++= −1ˆˆ , ),0(~ 2µσµ Nt  
 
This specification is used almost exclusively in practice (Girosi and King, 2008). The 
maximum likelihood estimate of θ  is given by )1/()ˆˆ(ˆ 1 −−= TvvTθ . Note that the 
estimate depends only on the values in the initial year and the final year. This implies 
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that data for two years are sufficient to forecast age-specific mortality rates by means of 
the Lee-Carter model. The forecast for the parameters v now becomes B7<DE = B7< + FGH, 
for H = 1, 2, …. Collecting all pieces of information and noting that in our case we only 
have census data for two years (2000 and 2010) yields the following. 
 
Assumption 3. The forecast for the mortality rate is given by 
 C ,DE = eJCKDLMKN7OPQPRS = eTUVW;;;;;;;DLMK.N7OPQPDXCOPQPYXCOPPPQP E/ 
																										= eZ[\K,OPPPRZ[\K,OPQPO DLMK.N7OPQPDXCOPQPYXCOPPPQP E/  
for H = 1, …, 20, where @A,	B7, and B7 are parameters estimated with the 
singular value decomposition (see the Appendix).     
 
We decided to estimate the Lee-Carter parameters based on Chinese census data 
for 2000 and 2010 only. In the middle of two census years (e.g. in 2005) a 1% sample 
survey is conducted and a 1‰ sample survey is conducted in other years. In these 
limited sample surveys, the mortality rates of the old population show large volatilities, 
because the number of surveyed old people is relatively small. Hence, there is no time 
series for China’s age-specific mortality rates with a sufficient survey coverage. The 
2000 and 2010 population census data are representative and obtained in a consistent 
way. 
The annual forecasts up to 2030 for the age-specific mortality rates with the 
Lee-Carter model are given in Figure 4. Note that ln:;;;;;;; = .ln, + ln,//2 
in our case.  
 
Insert Figure 4 
 
The rural-urban transition rates 
Data on age-specific transition rates of rural population becoming urban are not 
available and need to be estimated. As mentioned before, this transition is caused by 
two factors, migration and urban expansion. The age-specific impacts of these two 
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factors are different. Whereas the migrants are mainly represented in the younger age 
groups, the transition due to urban expansion plays a role in a much wider range of 
ages. 
 
We will estimate the age-specific rural-urban population transition in three steps. 
First, we estimate the aggregate rural-urban population transition. Second, we split this 
into the part that is due to urban expansion and the part due to migration. Third, we 
estimate the age structures for the two types of rural-urban population transition. The 
estimated aggregate rural-urban population transition due to urban expansion is then 
distributed over the age groups according to the corresponding estimated age structure, 
and the same is done for the transition due to migration, after which the rates are 
determined. Summarized, this yields the following.  
 
























                                 
 
Here, ik and ik
~
 are the female and the male rural-urban population transition rates of 
age group i; rin and rin~  are the numbers of female and male rural persons in age group 
i; e  and g  are the aggregate rural-urban population transition due to urban expansion 
and due to migration; eiq  and 
e
iq~  are the females and males in age group i as a share 
of the aggregate rural-urban population transition due to urban expansion; and giq  and 
g
iq~ are the females and males in age group i as a share of the aggregate rural-urban 
population transition due to migration. The details of the estimation procedure are 
discussed in what follows. 
In the first step, the aggregate rural-urban transition is estimated. This is done by 
employing the decomposition approach of Zhang and Song (2003). The idea is that the 
actual growth of the urban population (for which data are available) is caused by natural 
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growth and by net rural-urban population transition. The natural urban growth can be 
estimated using the fertility and mortality rates of the urban population. The aggregate 
rural-urban population transition can thus be estimated by deducting the natural urban 
population growth from the actual urban population growth.9 NBS, only includes 
persons with permanent urban residence (those who have lived in urban areas for six 
months or more) in its urban population statistics.10 Therefore, the temporary rural 
migrants to urban areas (who have migrated to urban areas for less than six months) are 
not considered as rural-urban migrants in the present study.  
The results are given in Table 1 and show, for example, that the urban population 
increased from 645.12 million persons in 2009 to 669.78 million persons in 2010. The 
actual growth in urban population was thus 24.66 million persons. The natural growth 
in the urban population, as calculated with the urban fertility rates and mortality rates in 
2010, was 3.27 million persons. The aggregate rural-urban population transition is 
therefore estimated as 24.66 – 3.27 = 21.39 million persons.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
The second step splits the aggregate rural-urban population transition into the 
part due to urban expansion and the part due to migration. To this end, we estimate the 
part that is due to urban expansion. Because of data availability, this part is easier to 
estimate than the part due to migration. The transition due to migration is then obtained 
as a residual, by deducting the estimated transition due to expansion from the estimated 
aggregate rural-urban population transition.  
The statistical standard that determines whether an area is rural or urban has 
changed several times in China (Zhou and Ma, 2003), the most recent of which 
occurred in 2006. According to this standard, the division takes place on the basis of 
residents’ committees and villagers’ committees. These are the smallest administrative 
                                                             
9
 The rural-urban population transition can also be estimated from the rural population growth. We find that the two 
results are almost the same. 
10
 Persons with permanent residence in urban areas do not necessarily have local household registration (hukou). 
Instead, they may be issued residence permits. 
19 
 
units and are the basic autonomous organizations for urban and rural areas. That is, a 
residents’ committee consists of and administers all urban households in its 
administrative area, and a villagers’ committee consists of and administers all rural 
households in its administrative area. Due to urban expansion, many villagers’ 
committees are administratively replaced by residents’ committees, for example, 
because most of the workers in a villagers’ committee are employed in non-agricultural 
industries. The rural-urban population transition from urban expansion is thus basically 
captured by the population in the newly created residents’ committees, which can be 
calculated on the basis of information in the China Civil Affair’s Statistical Yearbook 
(MCA, 2011).11 Once the rural-urban population transition from urban expansion is 
calculated, the migration can be estimated as a residual. Continuing the example above, 
the aggregate rural-urban population transition was 21.39 million persons during 
2009-2010, of which 13.71 million persons transited due to urban expansion. The 
estimated (net) migration therefore amounts to 21.39 – 13.71 = 7.68 million persons. 
Table 1 gives the results for the period 2006-2010, i.e. the years after the last 
change in the statistical standard to determine the rural and urban population. The table 
shows that the growth in urban population is mainly caused by rural-urban population 
transition and that both migration and urban expansion are important factors in this. On 
average, urban expansion and migration effects have an equal size but the results 
fluctuate over the years (and in no particular direction). To eliminate the effect of 
fluctuations, the average values over 2006-2010 in Table 1 are used in Assumption 4. 
That is, e = 9.18 million persons and g = 9.30 million persons. 
For the age-specific numbers of the rural population we use the 2010 population 
census data, which reflects the most recent state of the Chinese population. That is, 
 = ,  and  = , . The third step estimates the age structures. The 
sex-specific age structure of the rural population in 2010 is used as an approximation 
for the age structure of rural-urban population transition due to urban expansion. Rural 
                                                             
11
 A similar approach was used by Hu (2003) to estimate the rural-urban population transition caused by urban 
expansion. In that study, data (from China Civil Affair’s Statistical Yearbook) on newly created towns were used.  
Our study uses data on newly created residents’ committees because of a more recent statistical standard to 
determine rural and urban areas.     
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population shares are used because rural areas become urban. We have ]^ =
, /∑ ., + , /_=  and ]^ = , /∑ ., + , /_= .  
There are no detailed data on the age structure of China’s rural-urban migrants. 
China’s population census data only report the age structure of total migrants, which 
includes urban-urban migrants and rural-rural migrants, next to rural-urban migrants. 
The age structure of total migrants (as reported in the 2010 population census) is thus 
used (after correction) as an approximation for the age structure of rural-urban migrants 
(i.e. ]`  and ]` ). This treatment is also used by other researchers when studying 
rural-urban migration issues in China (see e.g. Zeng and Vaupel, 1989). We exclude 
migrants for marriage from the total migrants, because it is difficult for rural people to 
migrate to an urban area just for marriage (Sun and Fan, 2011). The share of young 
people will be smaller after correction than before, because the excluded migrants for 
marriage are generally young. 
The estimated age-specific rural-urban population transition rates are shown in 
Figure 5. They show a hump-shaped pattern, indicating a larger mobility of the young 
labor force (aged 15-49). Furthermore, the male population appears to be more mobile 
than the female population. 
 
Insert Figure 5 
 
For the pace of the urbanization process, Assumption 4 is relevant. It is assumed 
that the age-specific rural-urban population transition rates are kept fixed in the period 
2011-2030. This assumption is in line with the recent past and the most recent plans. 
Historical data show that the speed of urbanization process has been steady in recent 
decades. The increase in the urbanization rate was around 1.4 percentage point each 
year during 2000-2010. The twelfth five-year plan (2011-2015) sets a target of a further 
4 percentage points increase. This is the same as the target set in the eleventh five-year 
plan (2006-2010), which was actually exceeded. We therefore expect that the current 





5. The projections 
 
Taking the 2010 population census data as a starting-point, we have projected China’s 
population from 2010 to 2030 with the rural-urban population model, using two fertility 
scenarios. The population is divided into 91 age groups: 0, 1, 2 … and 90+. For 
convenience, the detailed results for all 91 groups have been aggregated to 19 groups 
when reporting the projection results in Table 2 (for the constant fertility rate scenario, 
i.e. Assumption 2A) and in Table 3 (for the two children policy scenario, i.e. 
Assumption 2B). 
 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 
 
Figure 6 graphs the projections for the total population under the two scenarios. It 
shows that China’s population will first grow and will then gradually turn to decrease 
under the constant fertility rate scenario. The peak will be reached around 2027, with a 
population of 1403.5 million, and the total population in 2030 will be 1402.1 million. 
Under the two children policy scenario, China’s population will continue to grow 
during the entire 2011-2030 period. The total population will reach 1458.4 million in 
2030, which is 4% more than the projection under the constant fertility rate scenario.  
 
Insert Figure 6 
 
Figure 7 gives the projections for the total labor force and shows a decreasing 
pattern in the following two decades. In particular from 2025 onwards, China’s labor 
force will experience a steep decline. This is because the Chinese baby boom 
generation born in the 1960s will start retiring in 2025. The total labor force will 
decrease between 2010 and 2030 with approximately 6% (from 998.8 million persons 
to 938.2 million persons under the constant fertility rate scenario and to 939.2 million 
22 
 
persons under the two children policy scenario). Observe that the projections for the 
total labor force are exactly the same for both fertility scenarios in the years 2011-2028. 
The reason is that the labor force in this study is defined as the population aged 15-64 
and that the total fertility rate in the two children policy scenario starts to increase in 
2014. The policy adjustment starts to affect the labor force only when the first babies 
under the two children policy enter the labor at the age of 15, which is in 2029. To get 
some insight in the different effects of both scenarios on the labor force, we have 
extended our projections to 2050. Figure 7 shows that the labor force will continue to 
decrease, despite the effects of rising total fertility rate on the labor force from 2029 
onwards. The two children policy cannot reverse the decreasing trend in China’s labor 
force in the next 40 years, although it does slow down the decline. As Figure 7 shows, 
the gap between the results for the two fertility scenarios is widening from 2029 
onwards. 
 
Insert Figure 7 
 
Table 2 gives the projections for each age group, assuming fertility rates that are 
fixed at the level of 2010. In the following two decades China will experience a rather 
fast ageing process. The share of the age group 65+ in China’s population will increase 
from 8.9% in 2010 to 14.3% in 2020 and 21.5% in 2030. In 2010, there are almost twice 
as many young people in China (aged 0-14) than there are old people (aged 65+). In 
2020, the sizes will be more or less the same. In 2030, however, there will be almost 
twice as many old people as there will be young people.  
For the rural population, the share of the population aged 65+ increases from 10.1% 
in 2010 to 16.2% in 2020 and to 23.2% in 2030. The gap with the urban share of old 
people increases from 2.3 %-points in 2010 to 3.1 %-points in 2020, after which it 
shrinks somewhat to 2.5 %-points in 2030. This indicates that the ageing problem in 
China continues to be more serious in rural areas than in urban areas in the following 
decades. This is due to the fact that many young rural people will move to urban areas 
during the process of fast urbanization and industrialization. Meanwhile, the share of 
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the labor force (aged 15-64) in China’s total population will decrease from 74.5% in 
2010 to 70.8% in 2020 and 66.9% in 2030. 
If the current child policy is gradually loosened to a “two children” policy for all 
Chinese, Table 3 shows that the share of population aged 65+ reaches 20.6% in 2030. 
This is only 0.9 %-points lower than the projection for the constant fertility rate 
scenario (based on the situation in 2010, which was a “one-child” policy in urban areas 
and a “two children” policy in rural areas). Both fertility scenarios yield projections for 
the age group 65+ that are very close to each other also for the rural and urban 
population separately. This finding implies that at least in the following two decades the 
“two children” policy as recommended by several researchers cannot alleviate China’s 
upcoming ageing problem very much.  
Tables 2 and 3 show that also the projected urbanization rates in the two fertility 
scenarios are very close. Under the “two children” policy, the increase in the total 
fertility rates for the rural and urban population are basically the same, which leads to 
very similar effects on the growth of the rural and urban population. Because the 
rural-urban population transition rate is small for the infant group (see Figure 5) and 
because infants have a small share in the total rural population, transition only leads to a 
very minor increase in the urban population. The fertility rate changes in our scenarios 
therefore do not affect China’s urbanization process. If the estimated rural-urban 
transition rates for 2010 are fixed in the following two decades, the projections show 
that China’s fast urbanization process will continue. That is, China’s urbanization rate 
will reach 62% in 2020 and 71% in 2030. For developed countries, the current 
urbanization rate is around 80%.12 When compared with developed countries, China’s 
urbanization level will still lag behind in the following two decades, even if it continues 
its current fast urbanization process.  
 
 
6. A comparison of projections 
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The United Nations (2013) recently revised its projections for the Chinese population 
on the basis of China’s 2010 population census data. According to UN’s result for the 
constant fertility rate scenario, the share of population aged 65+ will reach 11.7% in 
2020 and 16.4% in 2030.13 This is considerably lower than our projections, for which 
there are three reasons. First, although the UN revised its projection on the basis of  
China’s 2010 population census data, we find that the 2010 population structure they 
report is quite different from the structure in the original data. According to UN (2013), 
the population in the age groups 0-14 is 18.1% of the total population in 2010, that in 
age groups 15-64 is 73.5%, and the share of the age group 65+ is 8.4%. However, the 
corresponding figures in the original 2010 population census are 16.6%, 74.5% and 
8.9%, respectively. The share of the young population is 1.5% larger in the UN data 
than in the census data that we have used. The shares for the labor force and the old 
people are smaller. This difference in starting point will obviously affect the projections 
in later years. Second, the UN projection for China’s future mortality pattern is obtained 
by using data from developed countries. Our projections use the future age-specific 
mortality rates as estimated by the Lee-Carter model. These estimates are based on 
China’s development pattern of mortality rates between 2000 and 2010, using Chinese 
population census data. We believe that modeling China’s mortality rates by using the 
country’s own data is more realistic than using the data of developed countries.  
Third, our model distinguishes between the rural and the urban population, and 
takes urbanization into account. As mentioned before, their demographic features of the 
two population groups are very different in terms of fertility, mortality and migration. 
The fertility rate and the mortality rate of the urban population are significantly smaller 
than those of the rural population. At the same time, a fast urbanization process will 
take place in the following two decades. If urbanization is taken into account the share 
of the urban (rural) population is larger (smaller) than in the case where urbanization is 
                                                             
13
 In its projection result with their medium fertility rate scenario, the share of population aged 65+ in 2020 and 2030 
are 11.7% and 16.2%, very close to the projection result with constant fertility rate scenario. For the high fertility rate 
scenario, the share of population aged 65+ in 2020 and 2030 are 11.4% and 15.4%, 0.3 and 0.8 percentage points less 
than the constant fertility rate scenario. For the low fertility rate scenario, the share of population aged 65+ in 2020 
and 2030 are 12.0% and 17.1%, 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points higher than the constant fertility rate scenario. 
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neglected. The average fertility and mortality rate of China’s population as a whole 
(using the share of urban and rural population as weights) are thus smaller when 
urbanization is accounted for than in the case where urbanization is neglected. Smaller 
fertility and mortality rates (when urbanization is implemented in the model) yield a 
larger share of old people in the projections. That is, not taking urbanization into 
account will lead to a share of people aged 65+ that is smaller than when urbanization is 
accounted for in the model.  
To quantify the effect of separating the rural and urban population, we have also 
made age-specific population projections with a version of the model where the 
rural/urban distinction is not built in. In the constant fertility rate scenario, the share of 
population aged 65+ in 2030 will be 21.0%. This is 0.5 %-points less than the result 
with our full rural-urban population model (see Table 2). The difference is comparable 
to the effect caused by the two children policy (0.9 %-points less than in the baseline 
scenario with constant fertility rate). Therefore, the rural and urban population need to 
be modeled separately when projecting the Chinese population. The effect of modeling 
them separately is of the same order as the effect one would like to investigate (i.e. the 
change in child control policy).  
Another recent projection of China’s population was presented by Mai et al. 
(2013). Their projection is for the period up to 2050 and they use 2000 population 
census data (because 2010 population census data were not published when they made 
their projections). They run several scenarios and the lowest total fertility rate they 
assume is 1.50, which is much larger than the 1.18 that the NBS published for 2010. 
Their model does not distinguish between the rural and urban population. With a total 
fertility rate of 1.50 and a medium pace of mortality improvement, their projections for 
the share of population aged 65+ are around 12% in 2020 and 17% in 2030, clearly 
lower than our projections. The different assumptions for the total fertility rate, the 
different approaches for modeling future mortality rates, the different base year data, as 
well as neglecting the rural-urban demographic heterogeneity will all have contributed 
to the differences in the projections.  
Furthermore, forecasts for the urbanization rate of China in 2020 and 2030 have 
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been published. For instance, the forecasts by the United Nations (2012) are 61.0% in 
2020 and 68.7% in 2030, which is quite close to our own forecasts. This also holds for 
the forecasts by Zheng (2011), i.e. 60% in 2020 and 70% in 2030, which are obtained 
from a direct extrapolation of time series of past urbanization rates. 
Summarizing, forecasts for the age-specific population shares (and thus ageing) 
appear to be sensitive to the underlying assumptions for fertility and mortality rates and 
to the inclusion of rural-urban demographic heterogeneities. Forecasts for the 




China is expected to experience a fast ageing process in the following two decades, 
partly due to the ageing of the large baby boom generation born in 1960s. In order to 
make projections, we developed a rural-urban population model. The model takes into 
account (i) that fertility and mortality rates differ between rural and urban population, 
and (ii) that China’s urbanization process reflects changes in the relative sizes of these 
two subpopulations. 
Our projections have been conducted under two fertility scenarios. First, the 
constant fertility rate scenario assumes that the child control policy will not change. 
The total fertility rates and the age-specific fertility rates are fixed during the 
projection period at the levels of 2010. Second, the “two children” policy scenario 
reflects the possibility that the Chinese government may relax its current child control 
policy and will allow all couples to have a second child. The total fertility rates are 
fixed at the 2010 levels during 2011-2013, after which they increase linearly during 
2014-2020 to 2.27 for the urban population and 1.80 for the urban population, which 
are the levels assumed for the period 2021-2030. 
The population projections showed that in the fixed fertility scenario the peak of 
China’s total population will occur in 2027 with 1404 million people (and 1402 in 
2030). In the other scenario, the population will continue to grow which will yield an 
additional 56 million people in 2030. Further findings that held for both scenarios were 
27 
 
the following. (1) China will experience a fast ageing process in the following two 
decades. The population aged 65+ as a share of China’s total population will be above 
20% in 2030. (2) The ageing problem will be more serious in the rural areas than in the 
urban areas due to rural-urban migration (which is an important factor in the 
urbanization process), mainly by young people. In 2030, the share of population aged 
65+ will be more than 2 %-points larger for the rural population than for the urban 
population. (3) China will experience a fast urbanization process, also in the following 
two decades. The urbanization rate will increase from 50% in 2010 to 71% in 2030. 
Our projections also showed that the size of the Chinese labor force will continue 
to decrease in the following two decades. The total labor force will decrease by 6% 
between 2010 and 2030. Because it takes at least 15 years before a new birth enters the 
labor force, the steady decline of the labor force cannot be reversed in our projection 
period (2011-2030) by loosening the child control policy from 2014 onwards. The 
decreasing size of the labor force may negatively affect China’s long-run economic 
growth. It certainly indicates the importance of raising the labor productivity for 
China’s future economic development.  
Finally, we would like to point out that also our projections suffer from 
limitations. One of them is the exogeneity of the total fertility rates in our model, for 
which two scenarios were used. Future work might be devoted to endogenizing the total 
fertility rates. Economic growth, for example, has been proved to be an important 
determinant of age-specific fertility rates. Another limitation is that our forecasts of the 
mortality rates also do not take medical, social and economic growth into account. 
Endogenizing the fertility and mortality rates in our model would be an interesting 
future step. A similar line of reasoning applies to our treatment of rural-urban migration 
rates. We consider these to be constant over time for each age. It is well-known, 
however, that rural-urban migration rates are dependent on relative income levels in 
rural and urban areas (see, for example, Zhu, 2002; Zhang, 2012). The differences 
between rural and urban income levels can vary over time, for example as a 
consequence of positive agglomeration effects and negative congestion effects in urban 
economic activity. We do not have reliable indicators for future relative income levels, 
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but our analysis could be enriched by endogenizing rural-urban migration under 
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Appendix. Estimation of the Lee-Carter model 
First, we would like to point out that the estimation result for Equation (1) is not unique. 
For instance, if ),( ti vβ  is a solution, then for any non-zero constant c, )/,( cvc tiβ  is 
also a solution. The model in (1) is underdetermined and two constraints are required 
for unique identification of the parameters (Girosi and King, 2008).14 
 
∑ @A_= = 1 and ∑ B7<= = 0  
 
Later, we will see that these two constraints are satisfied automatically in the estimation 
procedure. The constraint ∑ B7<= = 0 immediately implies that 67  equals ln:;;;;;; =
∑ ln<= /?, the average of ln over time for age group i.  
Next, we estimate @  and B . Let 	  = ln − ln:;;;;;; (centered log mortality 
rate), then (1) can be rewritten as 
 
ittiit vm εβ +=~                                                 (A 1) 
 
In matrix form: 
 
ΕβvM += '~
                                                  (A 2) 
 
with Thitm ×= )~(
~M , 1)( ×= hiββ , 1)( ×= Ttvv , Thit ×= )(εΕ . 
The age-specific mortality rates (or actually their transformations 	 ) in each 
time period (i.e. 2000 and 2010) are the observations used to estimate the parameters. 
As Lee and Carter (1992, p. 661) write: “The model cannot be fit by ordinary regression 
methods, because there are no given regressors; on the right side of the equation we 
have only parameters to be estimated and the unknown indexes B.”   Estimating the 
                                                             
14
 Lee and Carter (1992) use ∑ @A_= = 1 as the constraint for @A, while Girosi and King (2008) use ∑ @A_= = 1 (i.e. aM is a vector with Euclidean length 1). We adopt the latter constraint because it 




parameters β  and v  in Equation (A 2) is to find two vectors βˆ  and  vˆ , for which 
'
ˆ
ˆvβ  approximates the matrix M~  best. The estimates for the parameters can be 
obtained by applying the singular values decomposition (SVD)  on matrix M~  (Lee 
and Carter, 1992; Girosi and King, 2008). M~  can be decomposed as 
    
'
~ USPM =×Th                                                         (A 
3) 
 
where S  is a hh×  diagonal matrix with nonnegative numbers hsss ,...,, 21  (which 
are ordered in a descending way and which are called singular values of M~ ) on the 
main diagonal. U  is a hh ×  orthonormal matrix ( IUU =' ) and its columns  
Nuuu ,...,, 21  are called left-singular vectors of M
~
. P is a hT ×  matrix whose 
columns are mutually orthonormal if hT ≥  or whose first T columns are mutually 
orthonormal and the remaining columns are zeroes if hT < . The columns hppp ,...,, 21  
are called right-singular vectors of M~ . If the rank of M~  is equal to r, then M~  has r 







rrrsss pupupuM +++=  
 
The matrix '111 pus  corresponding to the largest singular value gives the best 
approximation to M~  in the least-squares sense ( Girosi and King, 2008). Therefore, 
the estimate of β  is obtained as 1ˆ uβ =  (i.e. the first column of matrix U ) and the 
estimate of 'v  is obtained as '11'ˆ pv s=  (the product of the first diagonal element of S  
and the first row vector of 'P ). Alternatively, the estimate of 'v  can also be obtained 
34 
 
as Mβv ~'ˆ'ˆ =  (because '~' SPMU = ).  
Since βˆ  is the first column of the orthonormal matrix U , its length is equal to 1. 
The constraint ∑ @A_= = 1is thus satisfied. In addition, because 	  = ln − ln:;;;;;; 
the row sums (i.e. summing over t) of M~  is equal to 0. Therefore, we have 



















2006 582.88     
2007 606.33 23.45 3.12 7.46 12.87 
2008 624.03 17.70 3.40 8.15 6.16 
2009 645.12 21.09 3.23 7.39 10.47 
2010 669.78 24.66 3.27 13.71 7.68 






Table 2 The Chinese population projection result under the constant fertility rate 
scenario (%) 
Age  group 
2010 2020 (Projected) 2030 (Projected) 
Rural Urban Aggregate Rural Urban Aggregate Rural Urban Aggregate 
0-4 6.7 4.6 5.7 5.2 4.2 4.6 4.3 2.9 3.3 
5-9 6.1 4.5 5.3 5.8 4.4 4.9 4.7 3.5 3.8 
10-14 6.4 4.9 5.6 6.9 4.5 5.4 5.5 4.2 4.5 
15-19 7.0 8.0 7.5 6.0 4.6 5.1 5.9 4.5 4.9 
20-24 8.5 10.7 9.6 5.8 5.1 5.4 6.5 4.9 5.3 
25-29 6.5 8.7 7.6 6.0 7.8 7.1 5.2 5.0 5.1 
30-34 6.2 8.4 7.3 7.4 10.2 9.1 5.1 5.3 5.3 
35-39 8.0 9.7 8.8 5.6 8.3 7.3 5.4 7.7 7.0 
40-44 9.2 9.5 9.3 5.6 7.8 7.0 6.8 9.8 8.9 
45-49 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.6 8.7 8.3 5.4 7.9 7.2 
50-54 6.0 5.8 5.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 5.6 7.3 6.8 
55-59 6.6 5.6 6.1 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.6 8.1 8.0 
60-64 4.9 3.9 4.4 5.9 5.1 5.4 8.9 8.2 8.4 
65-69 3.5 2.7 3.1 6.2 4.9 5.4 7.0 6.9 6.9 
70-74 2.7 2.2 2.5 4.3 3.4 3.7 5.6 4.5 4.9 
75-79 2.0 1.6 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.3 5.2 4.3 4.6 
80-84 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.5 1.6 3.1 2.6 2.8 
85-89 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.4 
90+ 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 
0-14 19.2 14.0 16.6 17.9 13.2 14.9 14.5 10.5 11.6 
15-64 70.8 78.2 74.5 66.0 73.7 70.8 62.3 68.8 66.9 
65+ 10.1 7.8 8.9 16.2 13.1 14.3 23.2 20.7 21.5 
Urbanization 
rate 








Table 3 The Chinese population projection result under the two children policy scenario 
(%) 
Age  group 
2010 2020 (Projected) 2030 (Projected) 
Rural Urban Aggregate Rural Urban Aggregate Rural Urban Aggregate 
0-4 6.7 4.6 5.7 5.5 4.7 5.0 6.0 4.7 5.1 
5-9 6.1 4.5 5.3 5.9 4.4 5.0 6.6 4.5 5.1 
10-14 6.4 4.9 5.6 6.9 4.5 5.4 5.5 4.5 4.8 
15-19 7.0 8.0 7.5 6.0 4.5 5.1 5.7 4.4 4.8 
20-24 8.5 10.7 9.6 5.8 5.1 5.3 6.2 4.7 5.1 
25-29 6.5 8.7 7.6 6.0 7.8 7.1 5.0 4.8 4.9 
30-34 6.2 8.4 7.3 7.3 10.1 9.1 4.9 5.1 5.1 
35-39 8.0 9.7 8.8 5.6 8.2 7.2 5.2 7.4 6.8 
40-44 9.2 9.5 9.3 5.6 7.7 6.9 6.5 9.4 8.6 
45-49 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.5 8.7 8.3 5.1 7.6 6.9 
50-54 6.0 5.8 5.9 8.8 8.7 8.7 5.4 7.0 6.6 
55-59 6.6 5.6 6.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.8 7.7 
60-64 4.9 3.9 4.4 5.8 5.1 5.4 8.5 7.9 8.1 
65-69 3.5 2.7 3.1 6.1 4.9 5.4 6.7 6.7 6.7 
70-74 2.7 2.2 2.5 4.3 3.3 3.7 5.4 4.4 4.7 
75-79 2.0 1.6 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.3 5.0 4.1 4.4 
80-84 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.9 2.5 2.7 
85-89 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 
90+ 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.9 
0-14 19.2 14.0 16.6 18.3 13.6 15.3 18.1 13.7 15.0 
15-64 70.8 78.2 74.5 65.7 73.4 70.4 59.7 66.3 64.4 
65+ 10.1 7.8 8.9 16.1 13.1 14.2 22.2 20.0 20.6 
Urbanization 
rate 







Figure 1. The age structure of the rural and urban population in 2010 
(Source: China 2010 national population census data, NBS, 2012.) 
Note: The percentages in Figure 1 refer to the shares of each rural age group in the total rural 




































 Figure 2. The rural and urban age specific fertility rates in 2000 and 2010 



































Figure 3. The age specific (aged 0-4 and 65-90+) mortality rates in 2000 and 2010 
(Source: 2000 and 2010 population census; NBS, 2002, 2012. 
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Constant fertility rate scenario
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